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40 South-West LGs under terror threat – Gani Adams

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You warned in 2022 that terrorists were setting up camps in the South-West. Despite repeated alerts, gunmen attacked three schools in Oriire, Oyo State, on Friday, killing two people and abducting teachers and students. What failures by the authorities made this attack possible?

The office of the Aare Ona Kakanfo has been limited to just giving out information without being given room for collaboration. I have more information that I can give to law enforcement agencies. Six months ago, we tried to work on our intelligence across the entire South-West region. We spotted many local governments where there was an influx of these terrorists — I won’t call them bandits again. If you call them bandits, you are playing down the kind of criminals they are. We spotted many local governments and we documented it.

How many local governments were affected?

We have 137 local government areas in the South-West, and we spotted not remnants of terrorists, but a lot of terrorists in no fewer than 40 local governments. We have many terrorists that have infiltrated those local government areas.

Did your intelligence reports produce any action?

We kept that document to ourselves because we were more confident that working with state governments, which are the institutions governing the states, would yield results compared to working with law enforcement agents. As a result, we called for collaboration with state governments for the past two years. This is a government that knows your antecedents, knows that you have a structure across Yorubaland, even beyond Yorubaland and in some northern states, yet refuses to talk to you, refuses to agree with you, or even assist you despite being in power and benefitting from security votes. Yet they didn’t call to discuss with you. So, you have to bear in mind that the only assistance you can give to Yoruba people is to talk to the media and give little information that some states have been infiltrated and that there would be attacks in those states, because you are not helping matters by divulging the entire information.For me to raise the alarm that some states have been infiltrated and that terrorists would strike means that the information was based on intelligence and that it would happen. Precisely in November last year, I raised the alarm during the Ajagunmale Festival in Ibeju-Lekki, Lagos, that terrorists had moved from Kogi to attack Ondo and Ekiti states. This was apart from the one I raised in 2022 about the infiltration of Yorubaland. And what is happening in the two states? An Oba was killed in Ondo State about two months ago. Now these people have shifted a little to Oyo State, and we have witnessed about two or three attacks in Ibadan. Definitely, they are determined to move to Lagos.

There was a time I raised the issue of Lagos. Just three days ago, I got information that there was an influx of terrorists into a cattle market after the Lagos boundary into Ogun State. And if care is not taken, anything can happen in Lagos. Also, from the information we have, the target of some of these terrorists is Lagos. They are looking for a way for something to happen simultaneously in Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ondo and Ekiti states. I just saw the video of a prophet saying we should be watchful because anything can happen in Yorubaland. I was just laughing. This goes beyond when a soothsayer gives you a spiritual message. This is what we have gathered from intelligence.

After the Oriire attack, hunters reportedly tried to rescue the victims but retreated after facing superior firepower. Can hunters and local groups truly confront these terrorists if properly empowered?

The power of the hunters is limited. Most of the hunters are not like our native hunters, who had spiritual potential like the hunters of old in Yorubaland. At the same time, the Amotekun Corps in South-West states has limited powers. By law, the Federal Government did not allow them to handle sophisticated firearms. And what we have seen is that if Amotekun personnel were allowed to carry superior weapons like AK-47 rifles and others, and there was collaboration through my office, through the South-West Security Stakeholders, which comprises 14 organisations, you could gather the strength and population of these organisations.

Which groups make up the South-West Security Stakeholders?

The South-West Security Stakeholders’ Group, led by the Aare Ona Kakanfo of Yorubaland, comprises the Oodua People’s Congress, Agbekoya Society, Vigilante Group of Nigeria, Professional Hunters Association, Oodua Warriors, Vigilante Jahun, Agbekoya Peace Movement, Agbekoya Solidarity Movement, COMSAIC, Isokan Ile Oodua, Egbe Obinrin Oodua Agbaye and Omo Oduduwa United, among others, all of which have grassroots structures across local governments. These 14 different groups have the potential for security relevance and good antecedents in local security. There are many things these groups can do if there is collaboration, whether at the state or local level. But some politicians just gather some Agbekoya members and hunters without proper coordination, without speaking to the source, and without engaging the leaders of the organisations. By doing that, you are only dealing with the weak products of those organisations. But when you discuss with the leaders, they can provide you with the strong and brave members of the organisations to work with you. We could even show them the strategies we normally use on security and what it takes to handle crime. But you have a situation where some local government chairmen just gather some hunters and OPC members in their local governments, give them money and patrol vehicles, and expect them to perform. Some of those people don’t have the spiritual potential or the strategy needed to tackle sophisticated criminals. You are in Lagos; you can reflect on the antecedents of OPC from around 1999 to 2005 and what OPC did until law enforcement agencies tried to frustrate us. The frustration gave us a bad image. Through law enforcement agents, many of our members were imprisoned, some were brutally killed, and we went low. People ask whether OPC is still alive like before. The question we ask them is: did you give OPC the job to do? The structure is intact and OPC is still well coordinated, even more than it was between 2000 and 2005.

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But OPC is now split into factions. Doesn’t that weaken its effectiveness?

You can talk about three factions. There is no major group that will not have smaller factions. Even in political parties, you have the major parties and then some remnants that want to use the same name. But if the situation demands it, and it concerns Yorubaland, we bring them together. We collaborate with areas that have structures. We will not exclude any OPC faction from the issue of security. All hands must be on deck to confront these criminals. You can have less potential and still know the criminals in your area. Security is not always about carrying sophisticated arms. You need intelligent people. You need people who can infiltrate enemy territories. You need multilingual people who can speak different languages and use that advantage to gather intelligence. You also need people with spiritual potential. You even need clerics who will pray for the success of your mission. So, the issue of security has different sectors. By combining those sectors, you can achieve victory against criminals.

One abducted teacher was reportedly beheaded in the Oyo attack. What message are the terrorists trying to send?

They used that innocent man to send a message. And don’t forget that Oriire Local Government is at the extreme end of Ogbomoso. Oriire shares boundaries with Kwara State, and some parts of Kwara State have practically been taken over by terrorists. Parts of Oriire Local Government also share boundaries with the extreme end of Oke-Ogun. Places like Igboho and Igbeti share boundaries with Kwara State, and some parts of that area share boundaries with the Benin Republic. And don’t forget that the Benin Republic is facing security threats from these terrorists.

Recall the attack that happened in a Kwara community about three months ago, which led to the killing of 200 people. Most of the terrorists came from the Benin Republic to attack Kwara State. So the areas of Oriire, Ogbomoso, Igbeti and Igboho are places that share boundaries with Kwara State and the Benin Republic. Some places in Ekiti State also share boundaries with Kogi and Kwara states. So, the influx of people coming from Kogi into Kwara State is very possible, and the influx of people coming from Kwara into Oyo State is equally possible.

So, I believe 100 per cent that the hardliners among the terrorists came from Kwara to carry out this havoc. This is not the first time.

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The first time they came to a community in Ogbomoso, they killed five forest guards about two months ago. They used that incident to test the waters. The second time, they kidnapped about 40 people.

Could locals be collaborating with these terrorists?

It’s possible because, in some areas, it is not only Northerners or terrorists coming from the Sahel or Chad who are involved in these acts. They have agents whom they pay huge amounts of money to gather intelligence for them. Before they strike, they make sure they have someone who will provide intelligence on that area over a period of two months. It is a well-coordinated operation.

These are people trained by ISIS, Al-Qaeda and ISWAP. So they are internationally trained to fight guerrilla warfare. It’s not only guerrilla tactics they are using; it is guerrilla warfare. They strike and move people away, or kill and disappear. You do not know their actual base, where the Nigerian Army, native security groups or the police can strike them, or where air raids can target them. They operate and move from one place to another.

The only way to stop or reduce this security threat is for every relevant group to work with the government.

The kidnappers are yet to demand ransom. What does that suggest to you?

I think they want to use the tactics employed in the Chibok girls’ case, because most of the pupils are female. It is a very bad signal to Yorubaland.

Many expect you to mobilise Agbekoya, hunters and other groups against these invaders. What is delaying that move?

Yes, I have authority over every community, but I also have leaders under me. Even in the olden days, a warrior could not go to war without the approval of the king and the council of chiefs. The Aare Ona Kakanfo could not go to war without the approval of the Alaafin and the Oyomesi. So there is a structure.

Now that we have moved from monarchy being in charge of communities, we have governments — federal, state and local governments. You cannot intrude into the security architecture of any community without the approval of the state and local governments. This is not a minor security operation involving just five people. If you want to carry out a mass operation against terrorists in a community, you might need up to 500 people.

So when you move 500 armed men into a state without the approval of that state’s authorities, you create a security threat. Moving 500 people with weapons would require at least 30 buses and heavily built men with their equipment and protection. As you pass through a state, whether you display banners or not, security personnel at checkpoints will notice and communicate with their superiors. Those superiors will inform the security adviser, who will then alert the governor.

If the governor is unaware of your movement, he will order that such people be apprehended. When the 500 people are apprehended and asked why they are in the state, and they say they came to fight terrorism, they will be asked who authorised the operation. Did you discuss it with the Commissioner of Police? Did you engage the Director of the Department of State Services? Did the governor approve it? If you cannot provide satisfactory answers, you are in trouble.

The police will charge you with illegal possession of arms and ammunition, which carries about 10 to 15 years imprisonment. You will also face several other charges related to causing security threats. Before you realise the implications, you are already in jail.

But when there is understanding with the governor, he will inform the Commissioner of Police that some men want to collaborate with security agencies, and then you can work together without problems. We made many mistakes when we started OPC, and we do not want to repeat them. My current position is different from that of a national coordinator of OPC. I now hold a title that covers the entire Yorubaland. So, I must demonstrate to Yoruba people and the global community that I will not act against the laws of the country. We must operate within the confines of the law.

If the governors give the green light, are you ready for battle?

Definitely. The structure is there. Even in places with weak structures, we will move people there to support them. And if there is a shortage of men in some areas, we will carry out quick recruitment. Although that is unlikely because we are talking about 14 organisations, and some of them have said they are waiting for my instruction. And if they are waiting for my instruction, I am waiting for the instruction of the South-West governors.

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Should traditional rulers convene an emergency security summit for the South-West?

They organised one in Ile-Ife, Osun State, two years ago, and in the communiqué, they gave room for collaboration, but state governments and the Federal Government are yet to listen. Even at that summit, only one deputy governor attended.

If traditional rulers call a summit on security, South-West governors ought to send at least their deputy governors if they cannot attend personally. The traditional rulers are trying to do their job for them, but only one deputy governor from Osun State attended the summit.

If the entire South-West royal fathers, who are the custodians of the land, invite you as an authority to discuss important issues, I think governors should take it seriously. You should not have the mindset that because you are the Chief Security Officer, you alone should convene such meetings. If you maintain that mindset, you may spend eight years as governor and leave office, while the monarch remains on the throne.

Governors should respect invitations from traditional rulers just as traditional rulers almost always honour invitations from governors. Almost every week, governors invite them to events and they attend. Your power as governor is temporary. Some traditional rulers are working spiritually. I am still working spiritually; otherwise, the situation could have been worse. But spiritual efforts alone are not enough. We need physical collaboration, and we are ready.

What must the authorities do?

So, the authorities must brace up. They must realise that all hands must be on deck to make sure our region is safe. And they should not forget that this is the economic nerve centre of Nigeria, and that 60 to 70 per cent of the economic potential of Nigeria is in the South-West. So, if anything happens to the South-West, like what we are witnessing in the North-East and North-West, the economy of Nigeria may collapse. Most of the expatriates that moved from the North and Niger Delta reside in Lagos and Ogun states. Most of them are bringing their investments to Ogun State. So, we should make sure that we do everything to secure this region.

Can state police solve the security crisis?

I still do not understand why state police has yet to become a reality. President Bola Tinubu has tried to push the issue of state police several times. There was a time he even promised that he would approve state police, saying international partners had spoken to him about establishing it in Nigeria. Also, during Ramadan, when some stakeholders came to break fast with him, he said he was ready for state police.

So, we should ask the President or the Presidency: what is the impediment to establishing state police? When there was agitation for state police, some people came up with the idea of creating forest guards. Within two months, forest guards were created and given sophisticated weapons such as AK-47 rifles. But these forest guards are seen in cities and towns; you don’t see them in forests. Rather, they are in towns using their rifles to intimidate civilians. They were supposed to operate in forests, but they were not recruited from among people familiar with forest environments. Instead, the recruitment was used to serve political patronage.

The Amotekun Corps, which should have been upgraded to state police and allowed to possess such weapons, has been denied that opportunity by the Federal Government. This is because they don’t want states to have certain powers. When you think about political advantage without considering the safety of the people you are leading, it becomes a problem.

Imagine the state of the families of the about 40 kidnapped people. Do we know the condition the pupils have been exposed to? Many of them are not familiar with bush or forest environments. These terrorists will keep giving them unclean water and unhygienic food. If care is not taken, we may lose some of the 39 pupils in the custody of these criminals.

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Nigerian woman arrested in India with N40.9m cocaine

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A Nigerian woman has been arrested in Indore, Madhya Pradesh, India, with 57.18 grammes of cocaine valued at more than Rs29 lakh (approximately N40.9m).

According to a report by News18 Hindi on Monday, the woman, identified as Emmanuel Joy, a Lagos resident, was arrested by Chandan Nagar police after she was allegedly found with the drug near IT Park, Sinhasa.

She was reportedly travelling from Mumbai to Indore to supply cocaine.

The report said the arrest occurred during heightened police checks ahead of Rakshabandhan and Janmashtami celebrations, when officers patrolling the IT Park Sinhasa area noticed Joy carrying a black bag.

“A foreign woman carrying a black bag appeared suspicious,” the report quoted the police as saying.

Police reportedly stopped and questioned her, but “her answers were unsatisfactory,” prompting a search in the presence of female police officers.

The search allegedly led to the recovery of 57.18 grammes of cocaine concealed in a transparent bag.

The seized substance was valued at “over 29 lakh rupees,” according to the report.

News18 Hindi reported that “Joy arrived in India from Nigeria on August 14 on a seven-month business visa and was living in Bandra East, Mumbai, where she worked at a hair salon with her sister.”

During interrogation, Joy allegedly told police that she purchased cocaine at a low price and intended to sell it at a higher price in Indore.

However, investigators are independently verifying her account.

A case has been registered against her under Sections 8 and 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act.

Police have also examined her passport, visa and immigration records.

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Following her arrest, Joy was produced before a court and remanded in custody as investigations continued.

Police have expanded the investigation to examine her mobile phone and other digital data in an effort to identify other people linked to the alleged drug network.

According to the report, investigators are trying to establish “who purchased the cocaine, who in Indore it was intended to supply, and who else is involved in this network.”

The investigation is expected to determine the extent of the alleged supply chain between Mumbai and Indore and whether other suspects were involved.

Source: punchng.com

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NRC, NSCDC foil railway vandalism attempt, recover nine cylinders in Osun

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The Nigerian Railway Corporation and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps have foiled an attempt to vandalise railway track materials at the siding serving the Dangote Steel Rolling Mills in Osogbo, Osun State, recovering nine oxygen gas cylinders allegedly brought to the site for the operation.

In a statement signed on Sunday by its Chief Public Relations Officer, Callistus Unyimadu, the NRC said its Principal Track Officer in Osogbo received a report on Friday, August 28, about the ongoing vandalisation of railway track materials and immediately proceeded to the site with security personnel.

The statement said, “On sighting the security operatives, the suspected vandals fled the scene.”

It added, “A search of the area led to the recovery of nine oxygen gas cylinders reportedly brought to the site for the illegal operation.”

The corporation said security personnel, including officers of the NSCDC Railway Command, had since secured the affected railway materials and the vicinity.

Reacting to the incident, the NRC Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer, Kayode Opeifa, described the intervention as “another significant success in the sustained efforts to protect railway infrastructure from vandals and other economic saboteurs.”

Opeifa commended the security personnel for their vigilance and timely response, while urging security formations across the railway network to intensify surveillance and enforcement against the vandalisation and theft of railway assets.

He stressed that “railway infrastructure constitutes critical national assets whose protection is essential to the safety of rail operations, sustainability of services and the economic development of the country.”

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The NRC boss also called on members of the public, particularly communities located along railway corridors, to support the campaign against vandalism by promptly reporting suspicious activities around railway tracks, stations and other railway facilities.

He further directed security operatives to intensify efforts towards identifying, apprehending and prosecuting those responsible for the attempted vandalisation at the Dangote Steel Rolling Mills siding.

Opeifa assured that the corporation would continue to support security agencies in efforts to curb vandalism and other acts capable of undermining railway operations across the country.

Source: punchng.com

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Lured online, sold for $5,000: Read how Nigerian youths are trapped in Asia’s cyber-slave camps

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When Sabiu demanded to leave the compound, his boss gave him an answer that still haunts him: “I had paid $5,000 to buy you.” What began as a promised job in Laos had become captivity. His passport was gone, his savings were stolen and armed guards watched over a workforce forced to scam strangers online. His story is one of several uncovered in this investigation by STEPHEN ANGBULU into the trafficking of Nigerian youths through social media into the brutal cybercrime camps of Southeast Asia

The last wrap of weed Sabiu sold in the Golden Triangle fetched him 20 Yuan, about $2.70. It was enough for a plate of noodles, which was all he ate most days, once, at night.

It was October 2024, and the 26-year-old who hails from Borno State had been surviving this way for months in Bokeo Province, Laos, a mountainous Southeastern nation in Asia bordering China, Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia. He was sleeping on bus station benches when he ran out of rent money, eating leftover food from restaurants, charging his phone by sitting in eateries until attendants chased him away, and selling marijuana at a small markup to other displaced Africans who had stumbled out of the same cyber-scam compounds that had held him captive. He had tried to kill himself once already, swallowing poison mixed into pineapple juice. It only gave him diarrhoea, after which he returned to scavenging.

A Laotian shopkeeper, a Buddhist who did not trust Black people, began letting Sabiu take noodles on credit after noticing that he, unlike other foreigners, always removed his shoes before entering the shop.

“He told me my character was different,” Sabiu said. It was the closest thing to kindness he had experienced in months.

“At some point, I was chatting with ChatGPT, asking it the easiest way I could just end it. It would not give me the answer. It just kept recommending agencies that could help me. That was how I found IOM,” Sabiu told our correspondent during a sit-down interview.

Before the weed supply dried up when his Laotian friend was arrested, Sabiu had built a fragile economy of survival. He buys at 30 yuan, sells at 50 and pockets the difference. It was, by his own reckoning, the most dignified phase of the six months he spent outside the cybercrime compound that had swallowed his scholarship, his savings, and nearly his life.

Scholarship that didn’t happen

Sabiu’s journey to that desolate point began in a university classroom. In 2023, he secured a scholarship to Jiangxi University of Science and Technology in China to study engineering. But the scholarship, he discovered upon arrival, covered only one year of Chinese language instruction. The remaining four years of tuition would fall on him. His father told him to return home. But Sabiu, who had “tried everything to leave Nigeria behind,” refused.

“I tried to be responsible. I tried to man up,” he said.

With a good command of Mandarin and English, Sabiu rose to the challenge. He taught English to private students in Xinyi city. He worked as a cargo inspector in Guangzhou’s business district, earning small commissions wrapping goods for export. But his student visa barred him from legal employment, and when Chinese immigration began cracking down, even those meagre earnings dried up.

“Unfortunately, in China, if you have a student visa, you cannot work for part time anywhere. So, your job will be illegal by the books. First, I got a job teaching English to a 17-year-old boy in my city, Xinyu in Jiangxi Province.

“But shortly after I started teaching English there, the family relocated to Guangzhou. This was when I became really broke,” he narrated.

It was during one of his trips to Guangzhou that he met a Chinese businessman who introduced himself as Wang Xu. The man was friendly, spoke English, and invited Sabiu to dinner. Over beer, Sabiu, a Muslim, does not drink, Wang Xu listened to his story and offered him a job, a three-month contract as a telecom representative in Laos during the summer break. The work, as he was told, involved helping tourists subscribe to local phone networks.

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“Everything sounded legit. He told me people in Laos do not speak English, so tourists need help subscribing to their SIM cards. I was like, okay, I am interested,” Sabiyu recalled.

He added, “My desperation took over me. I did not think twice.”

Given his aptitude and skills, Sabiu was by every measure the exact kind of bright and resourceful young Nigerian that traffickers operating Asia’s cybercrime underworld have begun to target.

“They do not just pick anyone anymore,” a senior NAPTIP operative who facilitated our correspondent’s access to Sabiu explained, adding, “They target intelligent youths with computer and IT skills, as well as those with clean health records.”

The operative, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorised to address the media, said between November 2024 and early 2025, the agency’s Intelligence and International Cooperation Unit intercepted close to 1,000 persons attempting to travel to the Middle East and Asia. But the Southeast Asian route, he said, represented something qualitatively different from the domestic servitude pipelines to Iraq and Saudi Arabia that NAPTIP had been combating for years.

“These are people with degrees, people who can code, people who understand trading platforms. And that is exactly why they are wanted,” the operative said.

Wang Xu bought Sabiu a train ticket to Sichuan Province, a 32-hour journey, arranged a hotel, paid for his Laos visa, and had an associate he identified as Wang Li escort him across the border. At the hotel in Sichuan, the Chinese receptionist gave Sabiu his first warning on this journey.

“He told me, ‘whatever you do, do not go to Myanmar. They kill people there.’ He said Laos is fine, but Myanmar, no. I told him I was going to Laos, not Myanmar. But something started feeling off,” Sabiu recalled.

He crossed into Laos by bus and was driven to Bokeo Province, to a place called the Golden Triangle, alleged to be one of the most notorious criminal enclaves on earth.

Bought for $5,000

The Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone is a sealed-off, Chinese-built enclave in northwestern Laos where the borders of Laos, Myanmar and Thailand converge at the Mekong River. Established in 2007 under a 99-year lease granted to Chinese businessman Zhao Wei, it was ostensibly designed as a trade hub.

In reality, however, it is allegedly a self-governed criminal city. The United States Treasury Department sanctioned Chinese businessman Zhao Wei in 2018 for running a transnational criminal organisation. As of 2024, up to 400 scam call centres operated within the zone. The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission revealed in 2025 that scam centres across Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos produced approximately $43.8bn in revenue in 2023, equivalent to 40 per cent of the GDPs of the three countries combined. The United Nations estimated that 220,000 people were being held as forced labourers in such centres across the region.

Sabiu described the Golden Triangle as mini state where the currency, signage and business language operated in Chinese. He said Laotian police couldn’t enter without permission from the zone’s management. For him, it felt like stepping back into China. Except this time, there was no way out.

On his first day, Sabiu was interviewed, not on his communication skills, but on his knowledge of cryptocurrency. After a 10-day probationary period, he was moved into the main compound. There, he saw persons from various nationalities; Ethiopians, Indians, Pakistanis, Filipinos, Brazilians, Russians, all typing at computer terminals, flanked by Myanmar bodyguards who, he said, “do not even smile at you.”

“They were just typing, and Myanmar bodyguards roaming around. They do not even smile at you. They have no sympathy. The moment you do something wrong, they can kill you. They just need an order.

“That was when I realised the whole thing was about scamming people online. We targeted Americans especially,” he said.

As Sabiu came to understand, the operation was a romance fraud on an industrial scale. Workers were instructed to find attractive female profiles on Instagram, women who looked 35 of age, with at least 500 uploaded photos. These images were used to build fake identities. An AI system processed selfies to enable real-time deepfake video calls via WhatsApp. A team of Russian women handled the calls. Once trust was established, the “girlfriend” would steer the target towards a rigged cryptocurrency platform that showed fabricated profits of 40 to 50 per cent on early investments. When the victim deposited their life savings, the money vanished.

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After his 10-day probation, Sabiu was handed a contract written in Chinese, which he could speak but not read. The guards pressured him to sign while his supervisor stepped out to smoke. Though he planned to work for three months, the contract he hurriedly signed bound him for two years. His passport was confiscated too under the guise of visa extension.

“That was the biggest mistake I ever made in my life,” Sabiu said, fighting tears.

“They took away my passport saying that they wanted to extend the visa. I had a tourist visa, which was only for two months. They said they wanted to extend it for three months. And that was it,” he added.

According to Sabiu, an Ethiopian detainee pulled him aside and warned, “Bro, if you know what is good for you, do not work in this company like me. That is the advice I can give you. They beat people and all they care about is money.”

It was the second warning, but it arrived too late. When Sabiu protested that his contract was only for three months, the Ethiopian shook his head and replied, “There is no company in Golden Triangle that will give you a contract for three months. Go and check what you signed.”

Sabiu confronted his boss, who told him to call Wang Xu. But the answer came back cold.

“Finally, he told me he had paid $5,000 to buy me,” Sabiu said.

He worked 17-hour per day. Toilet breaks were capped at 15 minutes. Those who fell asleep were tasered. His Indian friend Raju, who was “always smiling, always happy,” was dragged into an office one day after being caught collecting recruitment commissions from multiple companies.

“I heard a gunshot. They never brought him out. I messaged him. Till today he has not responded. This is one of my own wounds I was telling you about,” Sabiu said almost inaudibly, showing our correspondent the small, circular cigarette burn scar on his arm, a parting gift from his supervisor the day he begged to leave.

That night, Myanmar bodyguards escorted him to a car. They demanded his phone. When he refused, the driver punched him in the nose. They tasered him and drained his Binance cryptocurrency wallet of $9,000, his entire life’s savings, which was not enough to carry him through school. They dumped him by the Mekong River with nothing.

“I wanted to just jump in and kill myself,” he said. Instead of killing himself, however, he scavenged. He ate leftovers from restaurants. An Ethiopian man, himself an agent who sold people to the compounds, took pity on him and gave him shelter.

It took six months of homelessness, a recommendation from ChatGPT, and the intervention of the IOM, the Nigerian Embassy in Vietnam, NAPTIP and the National Intelligence Agency before Sabiu made it back home to Nigeria.

He returned to Nigeria in September 2025, broke and in debt, owing over N3m to a friend from a business deal that collapsed while he was trapped in Asia. He now lives with his father, a stroke patient, and uses his younger brother’s phone. He cannot return to Maiduguri where many of his creditors live.

The day before our interview, his mother found him vomiting blood in his room.

“People thought it was food poisoning from Ramadan. It was not,” he said.

‘They said I will earn $1,500 monthly’

Sabiu’s experience is not an outlier. It sits within a rapidly expanding frontier of trafficking that NAPTIP’s Director-General, Binta Bello, flagged as a national emergency. In February 2026, NAPTIP repatriated 23 Nigerian youths from Thailand who had been trafficked for cyber-enabled crimes. Agency data showed 93 convictions in 2025 and over 2,500 interceptions of potential victims.

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The pipeline is industrial in scale and chillingly efficient in design; efficient enough to deliver 28-year-old Offor from a quiet life in Abia State into the dense humid jungles of Myanmar. Offor lost his father in January 2025. In April, while scrolling Facebook, he saw a sponsored advert for an online marketing job with a Chinese company called Tanjin in Thailand, offering $1,500 a month. He tapped the link, joined a WhatsApp group run by an admin called “Oscar,” and was interviewed on video by an Asian woman named “Mary” sitting at a professional-looking desk.

“She could speak English. She was Asian. She asked me my age, if I knew how to use a computer. I told her I could use Microsoft Word, a little of Excel too,” Offor said. He passed the interview. His mother, cautiously optimistic, told him, “Since the company says you are not going to spend any money, maybe you can try it.”

An agent called John, whom Offor would never meet, arranged his visa, NDLEA clearance and flight ticket. On September 5, 2025, Offor boarded an Ethiopian Airlines flight from Abuja to Bangkok. At Suvarnabhumi Airport, an immigration officer walked straight to him, holding up the selfie he had taken on the plane and sent to Oscar minutes before take-off.

“They will tell you to snap a picture of yourself and send at every point in the journey. It was when I reached the airport in Abuja that Oscar sent me my Visa and a token of $500.

“So in Thailand, this female officer showed me my picture. The same picture I took inside the plane. I was wearing this same white native,” he said, flapping the hem of his native wear. His passport was stamped without the standard interview and no questions were asked.

What followed was a 24-hour descent into the underworld. Over the course of 12 hours, Offor said was transferred between seven Toyota Hilux vehicles, each handover at an increasingly remote location, each new driver armed. Then he arrived at a small camp where, for the first time, he met others like him, trafficked from various countries, including a Nigerian couple. At dusk, the vehicles could go no further. The terrain had given way to swampy rice paddies and steep, muddy hills.

“We had to remove our slippers and go barefoot. You had to crawl up the hills. We broke sticks inside the bush to use as climbing hooks. These people, the guides, were doing it so easily. It was clearly their regular job,” Offor said.

They trekked for six hours through dense forest, across two rivers waist-deep, in total darkness, with armed guides who communicated only through hand signals and torch beams that vanished ahead if you fell behind. Several people sustained injuries from falls on the slippery terrain, he said. The Nigerian man he had befriended was exhausted. Offor kept encouraging him in Igbo: “We do not have any choice. If we run, where are we running to? Look at the distance we have driven.”

Offor said they arrived at CK Hills Hotel in Myanmar at 5am, caked in mud. At daybreak, a vehicle conveyed them from the hotel to a fenced compound guarded by soldiers he would later identify as the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, a Karen ethnic armed group operating in Myanmar’s volatile border regions that the syndicate had contracted to provide military-grade security.

The DKBA soldiers carried rifles and machine guns, he narrated. They are one of several ethnic armed groups born out of Myanmar’s decades-long civil conflict which has splintered into factions, some of which have struck deals with Chinese-run criminal syndicates, providing armed protection in exchange for revenue.

Their presence meant that the facility was not merely a workplace for Offor and his colleagues but a militarised encampment from which escape was practically impossible. Inside, private security personnel wielded tasers and batons. Nearly a thousand people including Chinese, Nigerian, Indian, Pakistani, Ugandan, Kenyan were held there, each assigned a desktop computer, forced to execute fraud targeting wealthy foreigners.

Source: punchng.com

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