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Killings, abductions soar after U.S. airstrikes as terrorists kill 183, abduct 366 in 27 days

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WHEN American warplanes struck suspected terrorist enclaves in Sokoto State on Christmas Day, December 25, 2025, the Federal Government welcomed the intervention, which it said has its imprimatur as a boost to its war against terror.

But less than four weeks after the foreign bombs landed, Nigeria has descended into a more complex nightmare.

From Kaduna to Zamfara, Niger to Sokoto, Borno to Plateau, etc, armed groups have unleashed a wave of killings and mass abductions that have arguably exposed a frightening reality: The strike did not end terror, it rearranged it.

Today, the world’s largest black nation is confronting not just Boko Haram, bandits or emerging groups like Lakurawa but also a dangerous fusion of terrorism and organised crime, spreading faster than her capacity to contain it.

Tellingly, the U.S strikes appear to have become a catalyst for domestic chaos.

The strike that shook Northern Nigeria

On December 25, U.S. forces launched rare airstrikes on alleged Islamic State-linked targets in Sokoto state, North-Western Nigeria.

Washington described the operation as a decisive blow against jihadist networks operating beyond the traditional Boko Haram theatre.

From the beginning, the operation raised troubling questions. Who exactly were the targets? How many terrorists or bandits were killed? Were civilians affected? Did the strike degrade terrorist capacity or provoke retaliation?

Official answers were scarce but events on the ground began to speak louder than statements.

Within 24 hours of the strike, armed attacks intensified across multiple states on a daily basis as if the terrorists are daring the U.S to launch more airstrikes.

From airstrikes to anarchy

The North-West, already Nigeria’s most volatile region, became the epicentre of renewed bloodshed. States in North-Central and North-East zones were not spared as well.

Between December 26, 2025 and January 21, 2026, villages were raided in Kaduna, Katsina, Zamfara, Sokoto and Niger states.

Dozens were killed in coordinated attacks on rural communities, and hundreds were abducted in mass kidnapping operations.

Kaduna emerged as ground zero

In one of the most shocking incidents, armed gangs stormed three churches during worship on January 18 and abducted 177 worshippers in a single operation. And on January 21, five soldiers were killed and scores were injured when a Boko Haram suicide bomber rammed into a military convoy in Timbuktu Triangle in Borno State.

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Security analysts believe bandits exploited the post-strike confusion to expand operations, seize territory and increase ransom revenue.

“The strike disrupted some jihadist cells, but it also created a power vacuum,” a security source told Saturday Vanguard.

“Bandits moved quickly to fill that space.”

Boko Haram, ISWAP refuse to retreat in N-East

Contrary to expectations, jihadist groups in the North-East did not retreat after the U.S. intervention. Instead attacks on military positions continued, rural communities remained under threat, and insurgents maintained mobility across Borno and neighbouring states. As it panned out, foreign bombs did not dismantle local insurgency. Rather, Boko Haram and its splinter factions adapted as they have done for over a decade.

Rise of Lakurawa in Sokoto

Perhaps, the most disturbing development since December 25 is the expansion of Lakurawa, an emerging armed group operating along Nigeria’s north-western border.

Unlike traditional bandits driven purely by profit, Lakurawa combines ideology with criminality.

It imposes taxes on communities, recruits local youths, launches coordinated raids, and establishes territorial influence. Security officials fear that Lakurawa represents a bridge between Sahelian jihadist networks and Nigeria’s bandit economy. If unchecked, it could transform the North-West into a new insurgency theatre similar to the North-East.

The shocking numbers

Although official statistics remain fragmented, data compiled from security reports, humanitarian organisations and media reports reveal a grim picture: Between December 25, 2025 and January 21, 2026, no fewer than 183 people have been killed and 366 people were abducted.

The worst-hit states are Kaduna, Niger, Zamfara, Katsina, Sokoto, Borno and Plateau. These figures are conservative because

many rural attacks go unreported or under-reported. Some accounts are denied or suppressed by the authorities like the latest Kaduna abductions.

In some communities, survivors bury their dead in silence.

Before U.S. airstrikes

Before foreign bombs landed Nigeria has been a killing field for over two decades with the situation assuming a dangerous dimension since 2014.

According to the National Bureau of Statistics, NBS, 614,937 people were killed between May 2023 and April 2024 and 2,236,954 people were kidnapped within the period Nigeria.

Although, kidnapping incidents reportedly decreased by 16.3 per cent in 2024, the terrorists upped their deadly game in 2025 as no fewer than an estimated 6,800 deaths were recorded in the first half of 2025
Specifically, April 2025 witnessed 570 deaths and 278 abductions, and in August 2025, there were 545 violent incidents, 732 deaths and 435 abductions.

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Timeline of violence after U.S. strikes

A day after the U.S. airstrikes, armed militia on December 26, attacked Bokkos/ Barking Ladies in Plateau State and killed 16 persons.

On the same day, bandits attacked rural communities in Nigeria State, murdered persons and kidnapped 12.

On December 27, bandits attacked communities in Anka LGA, killed five persons and abducted 20.

December 28: Three persons were killed and 15 kidnapped by bandits I Giwa LGA, Kaduna State

December 29: Boko Haram/ISWAP terrorists killed four persons in Gwoza, Borno State.

December 30: Bandits killed two person and abducted 10 at Faskari LGA, Katsina.

December 31: Lakurawa terrorists killed six persons at Tangaza LGA, Sokoto State

January 1: Bandits attacked a market village in Niger State, killed 30 persons and kidnapped 15

January 2: One died and eight were kidnapped by bandits at Chukun LGA, Kaduna State.

January 3: Bandits killed seven persons at Maru LGA, Zamfara State.

January 4: Bandits raided a village in Niger State, killed 30 and kidnapped many people estimated at 40

January 5: Boko Haram killed three persons in Maiduguri, Borno State.

January 6: Bandits attacked rural communities in Kaduna killed two persons and kidnapped 24.

January 7: Bandits killed four persons and abducted nine at Kankara LGA, Katsina State.

January 8: Six persons lost their lives to Bandits’ onslaught at Tsafe LGA, Zamfara State

January 9: Lakurawa attacks left 10 persons dead at Gwadabawa LGA, Sokoto State.

January 10: Five persons were killed and 18 kidnapped by bandits at Shiroro LGA, Niger State.

January 11: Bandits killed three persons and abducted 12 at Birnin Gwari, Kaduna State.

January 12: ISWAP attack left six dead at Marte LGA, Borno State.

January 13: Bandits ginned down two and abducted seven at Danmusa LGA, Katsina State.

January 14: Armed militia killed killed nine persons at Mangu LGA, Plateau State.

January 15: Bandits killed two and abducted six at Kagarko LGA, Kaduna State

January 17&18: Bandits attacked three churches in Kajuru LGA, Kaduna State and abducted 177 worshippers. In a follow-up raid three persons died and 10 were kidnapped.

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January 19: Bandits attacked a community in Rafi LGA, Niger State killed four and kidnapped nine

January 21: Five soldiers were killed and scores were injured when a Boko Haram suicide bomber rammed into a military convoy in Timbuktu Triangle in Borno State.

War without frontlines

Currently, Nigeria’s security crisis has mutated into something more complex than the Boko Haram insurgency of the 2010s. The conflict has morphed into three overlapping layers:

•Terrorists

Boko Haram, ISWAP and jihadist networks pursuing ideological goals.

•Bandits

Criminal gangs driven by ransom, arms trafficking and territorial control.

•Hybrid Groups

Emerging actors like Lakurawa, blending ideology with organised crime. The result is a multi-front war without clear battle lines. Bombing one group often strengthens another.

A senior military officer admitted in confidence: “We are fighting shadows. When you hit one camp, three new groups emerge elsewhere.”

Kidnapping as an Industry

Perhaps, the most dangerous trend since December 25 is the industrialisation of kidnapping. Bandits now operate like corporations: Intelligence units identify targets; Strike teams execute abductions.

Negotiators handle ransom talks; Logistics networks transport victims across forests; and Ransom payments fund weapons, recruit fighters and sustain criminal economies.

The end result: Nigeria has become one of the world’s leading kidnapping hotspots leading observers to wonder if the U.S. strike was not a mistake

Opinions among experts are divided.

While some argue that the strike was necessary to curb transnational jihadist expansion, others warn that it exposed Nigeria to the risks of becoming a new battlefield in global counterterrorism wars.

Clearly, the strike may have weakened specific militant cells but it also accelerated the fragmentation of armed groups, making Nigeria’s conflict more diffuse and harder to defeat.

Dangerous crossroads

Beyond the bombs and bullets lies a deeper crisis. Nigeria’s insecurity is fuelled by weak state presence in rural areas, unemployment and poverty, ethnic/religious tensions, land disputes, porous borders, arms proliferation, corruption and governance deficits.

Until these structural drivers are addressed, military victories may remain temporary and pyrrhic, and the country risks sliding into a prolonged era of decentralised violence, where bandits, terrorists and militias compete for territory, influence and blood.

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State Police Update: National Assembly collates reports from 30 state assemblies

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The National Assembly has commenced collation of reports from state Houses of Assembly on the proposed establishment of state police, with the Senate Leader, Opeyemi Bamidele, saying the constitutional requirement for the reform had been met.

Bamidele disclosed this on Thursday while delivering a lecture to participants of Senior Executive Course 48 at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, Plateau State.

He said at least 30 state legislatures had approved the State Police Constitution Alteration Bill, 2026, surpassing the constitutional requirement of two-thirds of the 36 State Houses of Assembly.

According to him, the National Assembly will collate the reports, consider the positions of the state legislatures and pass a resolution by a simple majority in both chambers before transmitting the bill to President Bola Tinubu for assent.

The Senate Leader, who is also Vice Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Review of the 1999 Constitution, said the National Assembly intended to complete the remaining legislative processes by December 2026.

He said, “We are pleased to inform our constituents across the federation that state police has moved from rhetoric to reality. We have already received formal reports from the state Houses of Assembly and, as of today, no fewer than 30 states have approved the State Police Constitution Alteration Bill, 2026.

“By the provision of Section 9(2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which requires the concurrence of not less than two-thirds of all state Houses of Assembly, the constitutional requirement for the alteration has been duly met. This is a historic milestone in our collective quest to re-engineer our security architecture and make it more responsive, more local, and more effective.

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“What happens next is procedural, but critical. The National Assembly is now constitutionally obligated to consider the reports transmitted by the state Houses of Assembly, collate those reports, and pass a resolution by simple majority of members in both chambers. Once this resolution is passed, the Alteration Bill will be transmitted to the President and Commander-in-Chief for assent.

“We have set a clear timeline for ourselves. We intend to conclude all these legislative stages — consideration of reports, passage of resolution, and transmission for presidential assent — on or before December 2026,” the Senate Leader emphasised.

The proposed state police system is part of wider efforts to decentralise Nigeria’s security architecture amid persistent killings, kidnappings and other violent crimes across the country.

Under the existing policing structure, the Nigeria Police Force operates primarily as a centrally administered institution.

Proponents of state police argue that allowing states to establish their own police services would improve local intelligence gathering, response times and accountability.

However, concerns have been raised about the potential abuse of state police by governors and other political office holders, particularly against political opponents.

Bamidele said the proposed reform would operate within constitutional safeguards, oversight mechanisms and human rights protections.

He described the development as a significant breakthrough after more than 15 years of unsuccessful attempts to establish state police through constitutional reform.

“What this means is that state police is no longer a campaign promise or a subject of endless debate. It is now a constitutional reality. It means that the security of lives, private property and public assets occupies a prime place in the legislative agenda of the 10th National Assembly,” he said.

Bamidele said the proposed system would enable states to develop policing structures better suited to their local conditions.

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He added that the reform was not intended to weaken the Federal Government but to strengthen Nigeria’s federal system by making security more responsive to local communities.

According to him, the objective was not to create state armies but state-led, community-anchored policing arrangements operating under clearly defined constitutional and operational standards.

The Ekiti lawmaker also credited the leadership of the Senate President, Godswill Akpabio, with supporting the reform, assuring Nigerians that the National Assembly would see the process through.

He said the National Assembly, under the leadership of Akpabio, “remains committed to delivering on the establishment of state police. We will not falter until every Nigerian, whether in Kuru, in Iyin-Ekiti, in Gusau or in Yenagoa, can sleep with both eyes closed.”

Beyond state police, Bamidele said the 10th National Assembly had prioritised legislation intended to address citizens’ welfare, economic development and institutional reforms.

He argued that the performance of the legislature should be assessed by the practical effects of its laws and interventions rather than the number of bills passed.

Bamidele listed the Student Loans (Access to Higher Education) Act, 2024; the Minimum Wage (Amendment) Act, 2024; the four Tax Reform Acts of 2025; and the National Social Investment Programme Act among the measures passed by the current Assembly.

The Senate Leader also cited the Electoral Act, 2026, the Cybercrimes (Amendment) Act, the Investments and Securities Act, 2025, the Nigerian Insurance Industry Reform Act, 2024, and the Regional Development Commissions Acts.

He said the laws reflected a deliberate effort to use legislation to anticipate emerging challenges, strengthen public institutions and improve governance.

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Bamidele said the impact of proactive lawmaking extended to national security, economic transformation, public financial management, electoral credibility, education, healthcare, technological innovation, environmental sustainability and relations among the different tiers of government.

On the relationship between the National Assembly and NIPSS, he called for stronger institutional collaboration to improve legislative foresight and policy development.

He maintained that the passage of laws alone was insufficient to guarantee good governance, stressing the need for effective implementation, funding and monitoring.

The senator said good laws must be relevant to citizens’ needs and capable of producing measurable improvements in their lives.

He, thus, observed that good governance “requires good laws. But good laws alone do not guarantee good governance.

“We require laws that are relevant, evidence-based, implementable, adequately funded, properly administered, effectively monitored, periodically reviewed and ultimately measured by their impact on citizens,” Bamidele stated.

Source: punchng.com

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FG pumps N5tn into military operations, read details

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The Federal Government has disbursed N5.15tn in special intervention funds to the Nigerian military and related security agencies between November 2023 and September 2026, amid persistent insecurity, including terrorism, banditry, kidnapping and other violent crimes across the country.

An analysis by The PUNCH of documents from the Federation Account Allocation Committee, obtained on Thursday, revealed that the government received N5.65tn into a dedicated special intervention account over the period, out of which N5.15tn had been disbursed, representing 91.15 per cent of the total funds.

The records showed that the intervention was financed through allocations from the Federation Account and other government revenue sources, including non-oil revenue and funds transferred from a FAAC withholding account.

The document, titled ‘Ledger of Special Intervention Programme for Nigerian Military September, 2026”, was prepared by the Federation Account Department of the Office of the Accountant-General of the Federation and formed part of the records presented to the Technical Sub-Committee of FAAC at its meeting in Abuja on October 14, 2026.

According to the ledger, the N5.15tn was released through 30 payment transactions between November 8, 2023, and September 23, 2026, while the total receipts were recorded across 33 funding transactions.

The disbursements were separate from the regular annual budgetary allocations to the Ministry of Defence and other security institutions, indicating the scale of additional financial resources channelled towards security operations.

However, the records did not provide a breakdown of the specific military operations, equipment purchases, personnel costs or security projects financed with the money.

A breakdown of the transactions showed that the intervention programme commenced with a N100bn transfer on October 19, 2023, described as the September 2023 allocation.

The first payment of N100bn was made to the military on November 8, 2023, while another N100bn was received on November 20, 2023, and subsequently disbursed on December 20.

By the end of December 2023, the account had received N300bn and disbursed N300bn, leaving no outstanding balance.

The funding arrangement continued throughout 2024, with regular transfers of N100bn and corresponding payments to military and paramilitary agencies.

Between January and December 2024, the account received N1.2tn and disbursed the same amount, bringing cumulative receipts and payments to N1.5tn.

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The transactions were largely recorded as monthly allocations under the special intervention programme, although the payment dates did not always correspond with the months for which the funds were allocated.

For instance, the January 2024 allocation was transferred on February 27, while the corresponding payment was made on March 1.

Similarly, the ledger showed that the programme entered a second phase in July 2024, beginning with a N100bn transfer on July 27.

The second phase continued into 2025, with the government maintaining the N100bn monthly funding pattern.

During the first nine months of 2025, the account received N900bn and disbursed N900bn, bringing cumulative payments to N2.4tn by September 1, 2025.

An analysis of the transactions, therefore, showed that N2.4tn was disbursed between November 2023 and September 2025, before the government significantly increased the scale of the intervention in 2026.

The records indicated that the funding arrangement changed considerably in 2026, with individual transfers rising from the previous N100bn monthly pattern to between N200bn and N500bn.

On March 18, 2026, the government transferred N200bn from the FAAC Withheld Account, described in the ledger as savings for March 2026.

The amount was followed by a N100bn payment to security agencies on March 16, although the payment preceded the recorded transfer by two days.

Another N250bn was transferred from non-oil revenue on May 18, 2026, while N130bn was paid to security agencies from the FAAC Withheld Account on May 25.

The ledger also recorded a N120bn payment to the Consolidated Pool Account II TSA on June 3, 2026.

This particular transaction differed from the other payments because it was not expressly described as a transfer to military or paramilitary agencies.

On June 16, 2026, the government transferred N400bn from non-oil revenue for May, which was reversed the same day.

The reversal was followed by a fresh transfer of N500bn from non-oil revenue, indicating that the earlier transaction was cancelled and replaced.

The same day, N500bn was paid to military and paramilitary agencies, marking one of the largest individual disbursements recorded under the programme.

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Another N500bn was transferred from non-oil revenue on July 15, followed by a corresponding payment to military and paramilitary agencies on July 22.

The pattern continued in August, when N500bn was transferred on August 19 and paid out on the same date.

On September 16, another N500bn was transferred from non-oil revenue, while the corresponding payment was recorded on September 23.

The final entry in the ledger showed a further N500bn transfer from non-oil revenue on October 14, 2026, described as the September 2026 allocation.

Although the ledger was titled September 2026, the inclusion of the October 14 transaction indicated that its financial position incorporated the latest transfer recorded at the FAAC technical meeting.

The figures showed that the intervention account received N3.25tn in 2026 up to October 14, compared with N1.2tn throughout 2024.

This represented an increase of about 170.83 per cent over the entire amount received in 2024, despite the 2026 records covering only part of the year.

Payments recorded in 2026 amounted to N2.75tn, compared with N1.2tn in 2024, representing an increase of approximately 129.17 per cent.

The N2.75tn disbursed in 2026 also accounted for 53.40 per cent of the N5.15tn paid out under the programme since its commencement.

The analysis further showed that the government disbursed more under the special intervention programme in 2026 than the combined N2.4tn released between November 2023 and September 2025.

It also revealed that the programme had an outstanding balance of N500bn as of October 14, 2026, representing 8.85 per cent of the total N5.65tn received.

The balance arose after the latest N500bn transfer was recorded without a corresponding payment in the ledger.

Consequently, the outstanding amount represented funds available in the intervention account rather than money already disbursed to security agencies.

Despite the significant increase in funding, the country continues to grapple with security challenges across several regions.

In the North-East, the military has continued operations against Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province, while banditry and mass kidnappings remain major security concerns in parts of the North-West and North-Central regions.

Communities in several states have also experienced attacks by armed groups, resulting in deaths, displacement and disruption of farming and other economic activities.

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The security challenges have placed pressure on government finances, as authorities continue to allocate substantial resources to military operations, intelligence gathering, logistics and the protection of vulnerable communities.

FG reviews strategy

Ina related development, the Federal Government has begun a review of the 2019 National Security Strategy to develop a new framework that addresses emerging threats, including terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, cybercrime, food insecurity and climate change.

The National Security Adviser, Nuhu Ribadu, disclosed this on Thursday during the inauguration of a committee to review the existing strategy and formulate the National Security Strategy 2026.

Ribadu, who was represented by Major General Sarkin Bello (retd.), said Nigeria’s security environment had changed significantly since the last review in 2019, requiring a comprehensive reassessment of the country’s security priorities.

“Our national security landscape is undergoing rapid and profound transformations. Since the last review of our strategy in 2019, the domestic, regional and global security environments have changed dramatically, with intensity,” he said.

He noted that the country was confronted with multiple security challenges that required a broader strategic response.

“As you are aware, these problems range from terrorism, banditry and kidnapping to sophisticated cyber threats, misinformation, economic problems, food insecurity and environmental challenges, among others,” Ribadu said.

He said the new strategy would serve as a framework for coordinating national security, resilience and sustainable development, adding that it must reflect current realities while anticipating future threats.

Also, the Deputy Chairman of the committee, Major General Evi Onumajuru (retd.), said the changing nature of security threats made a strategic realignment imperative.

He said traditional security challenges, including terrorism, insurgency and banditry, had become intertwined with non-kinetic threats such as cybercrime, economic vulnerabilities, food insecurity and climate change.

He added that the strategy must integrate the priorities of the Renewed Hope Agenda by linking economic prosperity and good governance with human security and national defence.

Source: punchng.com

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10 things to know about applying for 2027 SAN rank

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The Legal Practitioners’ Privileges Committee has invited applications for the 2027 award of the rank of Senior Advocate of Nigeria, with private legal practitioners required to pay a non-refundable processing fee of N5m and government-employed lawyers N2.5m.

The committee said the application portal would open on November 1, 2026, directing all candidates to complete the application process online and comply with its document submission requirements and deadlines.

PUNCH Online had reported Wednesday that Legal Practitioners’ Privileges Committee invited applications for the 2027 conferment of the rank of Senior Advocate of Nigeria.

Here are 10 things prospective applicants need to know about the exercise.

1. Applications open on November 11

The LPPC said its application portal would open to the public at 12am on November 1, 2026.

Applications are to be processed through its official portal, www.lppconline.com.

2. Private legal practitioners will pay N5m

The committee fixed the non-refundable processing fee for private legal practitioners at N5m.

3. Government-employed lawyers will pay N2.5m

Legal practitioners employed by the government are required to pay a non-refundable fee of N2.5m.

4. Payment must be made into designated bank accounts

Applicants are required to pay directly into either of the committee’s designated accounts:

– Zenith Bank: 1014103141

– Guaranty Trust Bank: 0213662834

5. Proof of payment must be uploaded

Candidates must upload evidence of payment to the online portal for verification.

According to the notice, the LPPC Secretariat will send a confirmation email after verification, allowing applicants to continue with the process.

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6. All supporting documents must be uploaded online

Applicants seeking the rank through advocacy or academia must upload clear and legible scanned copies of all mandatory and supporting documents through the portal.

7. Academic applicants have additional requirements

Candidates applying through the academic category must submit seven physical photocopies each of their curriculum vitae and impact statement, in addition to the required flash drives.

8. Every applicant must submit five flash drives

The committee directed all applicants to provide five flash drives containing copies of their completed application forms downloaded from the portal and all mandatory and supporting documents uploaded during the application process.

9. Online applications close on January 31, 2027

The deadline for completing online applications is midnight on January 31, 2027. Applicants are advised to complete their submissions before the deadline to avoid technical or procedural complications.

10. Flash drives must arrive by February 1, 2027

The five flash drives must be delivered to the LPPC Secretariat before 4pm on February 1, 2027.

The committee warned that applications that do not comply with its guidelines or are submitted after the prescribed deadlines will be rejected and treated as non-submissions.

The notice was signed by the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court of Nigeria and Secretary of the LPPC, Kabir Eniola Akanbi.

Applicants seeking clarification may contact the secretariat through lppcsecretariat@courts.gov.ng.

Source: punchng.com

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